Prefrontal cortex has been considered to implement processes such as attention, which control information stored elsewhere. In this issue of Neuron, Ester et al. (2015) demonstrate it also stores precise stimulus-specific information, questioning assumed neuroanatomical distinctions between storage and control.
In a world that is usually highly predictable, our optimal responses are likewise usually scripted. The tried and true way in which you make coffee every morning requires less effort, and is more likely to result in coffee, than if you devised a new method each morning. The brain quickly learns regularities in our environment and develops habitual responses to each expected situation. However, the brain must also constantly monitor for whether the environment is still the same as past experience would predict. We must be able to think and behave flexibly if the environment changes and the optimal response becomes unclear (such as when the coffee maker breaks). How do we select and remember the pieces of information that are currently most important, and combine them to create a solution to this new problem? How do we keep in mind that the current situation is different from usual and thus prevent ourselves from behaving in our old, habitual ways?
This flexible control of information and behavior has been called ''executive processing,'' and it has been shown by more than 100 years of neuropsychological research to depend critically on the prefrontal cortex (PFC, e.g., Stuss and Benson, 1986) . Exactly how the PFC accomplishes these feats, however, has been the subject of much debate. PFC is unique in that it receives converging inputs from all sensory domains. PFC neurons appear to carry information about whatever is currently relevant-with dynamic, multiplexed signals combining information about recent stimuli with potential responses and contextual rules (e.g., Stokes at al., 2013) . Such flexibility in neural selectivity, coupled with the wide range of tasks whose performance is affected by PFC damage, contrasts with the specificity and more rigid structure of sensory cortices. Differences in anatomy and physiology between frontal and posterior cortices have sometimes been interpreted as indicating that PFC is solely an executive processing region and does not represent sensory information, merely accessing and controlling information stored elsewhere. Stimulusrelated information in PFC has been interpreted as being qualitatively different, because it can be more abstract, more categorical, and not consistent across individuals or across time (e.g., Freedman et al., 2003) . In this issue of Neuron, Ester et al. (2015) provide evidence that brings into question both of these interpretations. They find that active representations of sensory information do exist in PFC during short-term memory tasks, and the format and precision of those representations is similar to that in other cortical areas. There may be less of a dichotomy between prefrontal and sensory cortices than previously thought.
The proposed dichotomy between frontal and sensory cortices is rooted in cognitive models that conceptualize the storage of information as distinct from the control of that information. Classic models of working memory (e.g., Baddeley and Hitch, 1974) , and of the control of short-term and long-term memory more generally, posit modules for storage that are separate from executive control processes, and this distinction is partially supported by behavioral and neural data.
In part, the evidence suggests that active information storage in working memory relies on different, partially independent stores for different types of information, while executive processes are more domain-general. Based on neuropsychological data and cognitive behavioral experiments, Baddeley and Hitch (1974) proposed domain-specific modules for the separate storage of verbal and visuospatial information. The visuospatial sketch pad has been further subdivided into visual and spatial stores (Logie 1995) . Neuroimaging studies support distinctions between three information types: verbal, spatial, and nonverbal/ nonspatial aspects of object identity (e.g., review Courtney, 2004) . Other information, such as semantic or relational, may also be maintained in working memory, and each may have its own neural substrate. Consistent with the idea of storage being mediated by sensory cortices, sensory cortices are also typically ''domain specific,'' such that early visual cortex and early auditory cortex process only visual or auditory information, respectively. Moreover, within visual cortex, for example, there are regions that are preferentially involved in processing motion, facial identity, and so on.
In contrast, executive processes appear to be ''domain-general.'' One can perform a verbal task and a spatial task concurrently more easily than two verbal or two spatial tasks, but there remains a common resource demand such that doing two tasks concurrently is more difficult, slower, and error-prone than doing the two tasks separately. This interference effect is more pronounced the higher the executive demands of the tasks, regardless of overlap in the sensory domains. These findings support the idea that executive function is qualitatively different from the highly structured, domain-specific systems for perception and storage of sensory information. The central executive was conceptualized as a controller of information, but not something that contained representations of information itself. It needed to be flexible enough to deal with any type of information. It seemed (and still seems) implausible that a neural system that is flexible enough to control any type of information would be able to also represent any type of information with good precision and fidelity since it would not have the highly structured neuroanatomy and modular specialization of sensory cortex. These ideas suggested a qualitatively different neural basis, such as PFC, with its highly integrative circuits and flexible responses of individual neurons. The association of these processes with PFC then implied that PFC would not store stimulus-specific information.
Research over the last three decades, however, has debated exactly how integrated and flexible PFC is. Particularly in humans, but also in nonhuman primates, it is now clear that there is a complex organization across different regions of PFC, but it remains unclear what the nature of that organization is (Courtney 2004) . The debate has often been couched as one of ''domain-specificity'' versus ''process-specificity'' (e.g., Levy and Goldman-Rakic, 2000) . A domainspecific organization would mean that PFC, like sensory and motor cortices, is organized according to type of information. A process-specific organization would mean that PFC is instead organized according to the type of cognitive process, such as selection versus manipulation. If the process-specific areas within PFC could depend on access to stored representations in other cortical areas, then PFC might not need to have specialized circuits to represent all the different types of information itself, and neuroanatomical organization solely by type of process would be more efficient.
Process-specific organization, however, neither necessarily precludes domainspecific organization nor stimulus representation (e.g., Johnson et al., 2003) . There has been much evidence for domain-specific organization within the prefrontal cortex (e.g., Levy and Goldman-Rakic, 2000; Courtney 2004 ), including areas with retinotopic organization (Hagler and Sereno, 2006) and neurons with stimulusspecific responses. The neural coding of the stimulus information, however, was thought to be merely categorical or so integrated with other task parameters that it might seem better considered as representing task rules and context rather than the remembered stimulus itself (e.g., Quintana et al., 1988; Freedman et al., 2003; Stokes et al., 2013) . Previous attempts to identify neural codes of stimuli maintained over a working memory delay using fMRI have found such representations in sensory areas, even in early sensory areas that do not show elevated sustained activity during the delay (e.g., Harrison and Tong, 2009 ; review in D'Esposito and Postle, 2015), but have not been able to find evidence of such representations in PFC. An influential interpretation of this lack of evidence has been that the elevated delay period activity observed in prefrontal cortex, even that which is clearly domain specific, reflects cognitive control processes required for the tasks rather than active stimulusspecific memory representations (e.g., D'Esposito and Postle, 2015) . In their current study, Ester and colleagues used an inverted encoding model approach, which they directly demonstrate is more sensitive than previously used multivoxel pattern classification methods. The previously used methods were sensitive enough to detect consistent patterns reflecting stimulus-specific memory activity in areas with more homogeneous cell populations where similarly tuned cells are more rigidly clustered into a columnar organization, but they do not appear to be sensitive enough to detect these representations in PFC. Moreover, Ester et al. (2015) find that these frontal representations of stimulus orientation have continuous tuning curves, similar to those in parietal and occipital cortex, rather than categorical responses. Ester et al. (2015) find that multiple brain areas, in occipital, parietal, and prefrontal cortices all contain information about the to-be-remembered stimulus. Some of these areas, but not all, also have elevated overall levels of BOLD MRI signal. Other areas have elevated overall signal during the working memory delay, but do not contain remembered stimulus information. These results could indicate a separation of stimulus storage and executive processes, but the dissociation does not seem to map onto a dissociation between sensory and frontal cortices.
Alternatively, the results may suggest a very different way of thinking about information representation and executive processes in the brain. Sensory and prefrontal cortices may both be organized into predictive processing hierarchies, with new bottom-up sensory inputs being continuously combined with neuromodulatory inputs based on representations of contextual information from past inputs to create new mental representations (e.g., Summerfield and Koechlin, 2008; Kanai et al., 2015) . These current and remembered representations then interact in a dynamic neural system that enables continuous inferences and predictions to be made regarding current and future inputs and appropriate responses to be made to achieve desired future outcomes. Predictions and inferences can be made at all stages along the neural hierarchy: in early sensory cortex, prefrontal cortex, and anywhere in between. The distinction between different levels of the hierarchy may lie in quantitative differences in parameters such as the time constants governing reverberating circuits. There would be no need for PFC to have a qualitatively different neuroanatomical organization, such as a process-specific organization, while the rest of the brain is organized by information domain. In such a neurocomputational perspective, there is no hard line between representation or storage of information and the processes that select, transform, and use that information. Patterns of neural activity, and patterns of relative strengths of synaptic connections, are the manifestations of information storage. Executive processes, on the other hand, are manifest by interactions among all those stored representations resulting in changes in information representation and changes in behavior. The unified system thus can achieve both stability and flexibility to optimally deal with whatever the environment may bring.
